In China bribes are often offered and
accepted for the sale and procurement of medical devices, pharmaceuticals, and
other healthcare products (hereinafter referred as the “Healthcare Products”). Doctors or managers of hospitals and clinics
who accept bribes to buy, use, or recommend such Healthcare Products have been
known to prescribe or even over-prescribe procedures that warrant use of such products. As a result, products supported by bribery
sell more quickly and at a higher price than products for which lower or no
bribes are paid, regardless of the inherent value or effectiveness of the
Healthcare Products themselves. This raises the overall price for all Healthcare Products.
Doctors filmed in taking kickbacks in clinic rooms
During Christmas Eve of 2016, the China
Central Television Station (“CCTV”) broadcasted a report showing doctors
in six hospitals located in Shanghai City and Hunan Province taking bribes from medicine sales
representatives. According to CCTV, the doctors were paid kickback amounting to 30 to 45 percent of the medicines’ selling price. You may follow the link to review the video
of the CCTV report.
CCTV footage showed a doctor in Shanghai
receiving a 1,800 yuan (US$260) bribe from a drug sales agent for prescribing
150 boxes of a medicine in a month, while in another video, a drug representative gave envelopes to three doctors at the same hospital within an hour.
A pharmaceutical representative can get a 10
percent cut from revenue generated by the medicine prescribed, the report said. The undercover investigation followed nearly
100 pharmaceutical representatives at four hospitals in Shanghai over eight months.
Reporters started with a mysterious group of “special patients” at a large Shanghai hospital with more than 4
million outpatients a year. Reporters found these “patients”, who have no medical records, showed up at similar times every
day. CCTV footage showed these bogus patients — the drug representatives — merely walked into the consulting rooms of the doctors, where they began checking doctors’
prescription tallies on their computers.
One representative, who was complaining of his lost smartphone, was comforted by a doctor, who assured him that he would soon be able to buy an iPhone 6 from
his illicit gains.
The drug representatives visited the
hospitals on a daily basis in the hope that doctors would prescribe more of
their products, the report said. It
showed they gave “envelopes” to doctors after entering consulting rooms. One doctor received envelopes from four
representatives within three minutes, the footage revealed.
Insiders said the higher the price of the
drug, the larger room there is for bigger cuts. This, in turn, served as encouragement for some doctors to
prescribe expensive drugs.
The footage showed a doctor in a hospital
in Changsha, capital city of Hunan, fuming over a less than expected cut— the going rate is a minimum 20 percent of the drug’s cost.
“It should be at least 20 percent higher,”
the doctor was filmed saying. “Others offer more than 30 percent, how are you competing with them? The price of the drug is so high, and you are such
a big company, which is hard to understand,” he complained.
The report also compared the prices with
the market rate of five drugs, with the biggest gap shown as being over 10
times.[1]
Multinational companies punished under the FCPA for
bribing Chinese doctors of state-owned hospitals
Many pharmaceutical companies and medical
device companies were found guilty and punished for violation of Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (“FCPA”) for giving kickbacks to Chinese doctors. Not only is untruthful booking of bribing expenses as
normal business expenditures prohibited under the FCPA, as bribing government officials is also prohibited, as Chinese
doctors are regarded as governmental officials under the FCPA.

On October 5, 2015, Security and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) charged B-company, the New York-based pharmaceutical company, with
violating the FCPA when its joint venture in China made cash payments and
provided other benefits to health care providers at state-owned and state-controlled
hospitals in exchange for prescription sales. The B-company agreed to pay more
than $14 million to settle the case.
On July 28, 2015, SEC charged
Illinois-based infant formula manufacturer with violating the FCPA when its
Chinese subsidiary made improper payments to health care professionals to
recommend the company’s product to new and expectant mothers. The
M-company agreed to pay $12 million to settle the case.
On September 30, 2016, SEC announced that
the UK-based pharma giant will pay a $20 million civil penalty to settle
charges that it violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act when China-based
subsidiaries spent millions of dollars on pay-to-prescribe schemes for several
years to pump up sales. The FCPA
offenses spanned, at the very least, from 2010 to 2013. The offences include gifts, improper travel and
entertainment with no or little educational purpose, shopping excursions, family
and home visits, and cash. "The
costs associated with these payments were recorded in G-company’s books and
records as legitimate expenses, such as medical association sponsorships,
employee expenses, conferences, speaker fees, and marketing costs," the
SEC said.
However, under Chinese law, the doctors of
Chinese state-owned hospitals are not governmental officials.
Doctors in state-owned hospitals not taken as governmental
officials under Chinese law
As a matter of law, the doctors in state-owned
hospitals are not Chinese governmental officials or state working personnel as
said under Chinese law.
On November 20, 2008, the Supreme People’s
Court and the Supreme People’s Prosecuting Court jointly issued the Opinions on
Several Issues Regarding the Application of Laws over the Handling of the
Criminal Cases of Commercial Bribery (hereinafter referred to as the
“Opinions”). Paragraph 3 of Article 4 of
the Opinions clearly provides that it regards medical professionals as non-state working personnel. If medical professionals are found to have taken advantage of their position to
prescribe treatments, illicitly accepted money or property from a seller of
medical products (such as pharmaceutical drugs, healthcare devices and
healthcare materials) and promoted the seller’s interests, they shall be convicted of having taken a bribe by
non-state working personnel under Article 163 of the Criminal Law
(emphasis added), and if the amount involved is relatively large.
The criminal liability
on the crimes of taking bribes includes imprisonment and confiscation of
illegal proceeds. The crime of taking
bribes (by state working personnel), if serious enough, could trigger death
penalty; the crime of taking bribes by non-state working personnel would not
trigger death penalty, but a maximum imprisonment of no more than 15
years.
Vis-à-vis the crime of taking a bribe by
non-state working personnel, the party that made bribes shall be punished for
the crime of making bribes to non-state working personnel under Article 164 of
the Criminal Law. For example, the local
subsidiary of the UK-based drug maker was found guilty of making bribes to
Chinese doctors and received a criminal fine as much as RMB 3 billion (nearly
$500 million) in September of 2014. As
above mentioned, for the same offenses of its local subsidiary, the UK-based
drug maker received a civil fine of US$ 20 million from the SEC for violation
of the FCPA in September of 2016. Some
local subsidiary's managers, including its former CEO, were convicted of
bribery-related charges and received suspended prison sentences under China’s
Criminal Law. However, both the local
subsidiary and its executive managers were convicted under Article 164 for the
crime of making bribes to non-state working personnel.
It has been a long time debate in China
about if a doctor (as well as some other functionaries working in state-owned
enterprises) shall be treated as a functionary discharging public affairs and
thus a member of state working personnel.
The dispute was not concluded until 2003 when the Supreme People’s Court
convened and decided that the engagement in public affairs means the
carry-out of duties in organization, leadership, supervision and management for and on behalf of state organs, state-owned companies, enterprises,
institutional entities, and the people’s bodies (emphasis added). The laboring activities or technical serves
not in relation to the power assigned to the function shall not be regarded as
public affairs. Therefore, the action of
prescribing drugs or medical devices by a doctor is then categorized as a technical
service other than the engagement of public affair, which then explains the
position of the Opinions that the prescription doctors are not state working
personnel.
Prescription doctors as non-state working
personnel are clearly distinguished from state working personnel in the
Opinions. Paragraph 1 of Article 4 of
the Opinions provides that “if any state working personnel in medical institutions are found, in procurement of medical products (such as
pharmaceutical drugs, healthcare devices and healthcare materials) to have
solicited money or property from the seller, or illegally accepted money or
property from the seller to promote the interest of the seller, by taking
advantage of their position, to the extent that such activities constitute a
crime, they shall be convicted of having taken a bribe (by State-working
personnel) under Article 385 of the Criminal Law (emphasis added). In practice, the administrators of a hospital
or the department of a hospital would be regarded as state working personnel (again
vis-à-vis prescription doctors as non-state working personnel).
What is more, some hospitals even outsource
some departments such as oncology to some private hospitals or enterprises. Therefore, there is argument that the doctors
in the outsourced clinical departments by no means could be governmental
officials.[2] For example, in 2014, Wei Zexi was diagnosed
with synovial sarcoma, a rare form of cancer that affects tissue around major
joints. After he received radiation and
chemotherapy, his family sought out other treatments. Through a promoted result on the Chinese
search engine Baidu, Wei discovered the Second Hospital of the Beijing Armed
Police Corps, a state military-run hospital which provided immunotherapy
treatments for those with his illness.
State radio operations claimed Wei's family trusted the treatment
because it had been "promoted by one of the military hospitals which are
considered credible, and the attending doctor had appeared on many mainstream
media platforms". Wei went through
four treatments at the hospital, spending upwards of 200,000 yuan ($32,116 USD)
with his family, but the treatments proved unsuccessful, resluting in Wei's death on April
12, 2016. Before his death, Wei accused
Baidu of promoting false medical information, and he denounced the hospital for
claiming high success rates for the treatment.[3] The hospital was also criticized for
outsourcing their oncology departments to private hospitals, a business mechanism quite pervasive in Chinese medical system.[4]
Are doctors of Chinese state-owned hospital governmental
officials under FCPA?
To answer the question, we have to revisit
the definition of the FCPA on “governmental official”.
The FCPA defines a foreign official as an
employee of a government or instrumentality thereof[5] and as any person acting in an official capacity on behalf of a government.[6] DOJ has adopted the position that
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and state-controlled enterprises are
instrumentalities of a government and that any employee of an SOE qualifies as
a foreign official under the FCPA.[7] To date, courts that have considered the
issue have concluded that some state-owned companies may qualify as
instrumentalities of the state and that whether an enterprise qualifies as an
instrumentality of the state is a question of fact that must be determined on a
case-by-case basis according to a list of factors specific to each entity. For example, in a case, the court set forth
the following factors in determining whether a company is a state owned
enterprise for the purposes of the FCPA:
--The foreign state’s characterization of the entity and its
employees;
--The foreign state’s degree of control over the entity;
--The purpose of the entity’s activities;
--The entity’s obligations and privileges under the foreign state’s
law, including whether the entity exercises exclusive or controlling power to
administer its designated functions;
--The circumstances surrounding the entity’s creation; and
--The foreign state’s extent of ownership of the entity, including the
level of financial support by the state (e.g., subsidies, special tax
treatment, and loans).[8]
Courts that have considered the issue
conclude that some state-owned companies may qualify as instrumentalities of
the state and employees of such companies may qualify as foreign officials.[9]
Some factors are seemingly in favor of the
position of Chinese law. Among many
factors to consider, Chinese government does not “fund” state-owned hospital as
it used to do or the funding is too minimal to neglect.[10] The hospitals are basically
competitors in a free market, where they need to compete with each other for better profit, and evern survival. To do so, some hospitals adopt a critical strategy, where they buy cheap Healthcare Products, then sell them at a higher price. This strategy commonly adopted by hospitals explain why so many medical
representatives go after doctors to promote their products.[11]
However, there are some fundamental issues
that are decisive in the governmental nature of state-owned hospitals in China:
--It is the state that established and owns state-owned
hospitals.
--It is the state that funds state-owned hospitals. In face of the reform of medical system, it
is the state that leads and funds the reform.[12]
--The fundamental purpose of hospitals, state-owned or not, is to secure
the healthcare and welfare for the people.[13] The medical reform is to have a better
medical system to meet this healthcare and welfare purpose (while motivate the
positive attitudes of doctors to engage in the cause of healthcare and welfare)
other than deviate from it.[14]
--The leaders of state-owned hospitals are cadres of Communist Party
of China (“CPC”) and/or state cadres that are appointed by the CPC committees
and the People’s Governments of different levels.[15]
In short, the holographic picture of
state-owned hospital is governmental.
The doctors of a state-owned hospital are nothing but part of
governmental instrumentality even though the doctors are from the outsourced
departments of a state-owned hospital. Speaking of which, outsourcing a clinical department of a state-owned hospital
seems like a non-compliance event. After the news of Wei Zexi, it seems that many hospitals are taking back their
outsourced departments.
As above-mentioned, in 2003, the Supreme
People’s Court concluded that a functionary in state-owned enterprise, if not
engaging in public affairs such as the carry-out of duties in organization,
leadership, supervision and management shall not be regarded as
state working personnel, which is then reflected in the Opinions of 2008. However, the conclusion and Opinions did not
deny the fact that state-owned hospitals (as well as enterprises) are owned and
run by the state as is like the governmental instrumentality under the FCPA.
Certainly, a doctor provides nothing
but “technical service”. However, if a
doctor provides “technical service” for a governmental instrumentality, the
doctor is then part of the governmental instrumentality. If the U.S. case law considered employees of
governmental instrumentalities qualified as foreign governmental officials, we would then come to a logical conclusion where a doctor working for a Chinese state-owned hospital, which is considered a governmental instrumentality, would qualify as governmental
official. Therefore, bribing a Chinese
doctor is bribing a governmental official, as identified in the FCPA.
* Licensed to practice law in China and the New York State of the U.S. Henry Chen is also the author of Commercian Bribery Risk Management in China. Henry Chen is available at Henry.chen@dentons.cn